

RAF and Intelligence Warfighting Function

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Intelligence is about people and a study of people. It is not simply a question of studying people on the other side, but studying one's own as well. We have to learn about one another, not just about strangers.

—Sir Maurice Oldfield¹

The Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA's) Total Army Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept requires a versatile mix of intelligence capabilities and expertise within the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWfF). The IWfF is a series of intelligence tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) whose common purpose is to "facilitate an understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations."² Additionally, the IWfF is the Army's contribution to the greater Intelligence Enterprise which is the "sum total of the intelligence efforts for the entire U.S. intelligence community."³

Army Transformation and Modularity efforts and the expansion of the brigade combat team-level (BCT) intelligence structure came at the expense of the conventional Military Intelligence (MI) battalion structure. The loss of MI formations created gaps in capabilities, Title 10 training, and intelligence certifications needed for MI units to access the greater Intelligence Enterprise. Twelve years of war, coupled with substantial overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding, allowed the Army to find materiel and personnel solutions to intelligence training and capability gaps. The RAF concept builds upon these solutions within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. IWfF solutions and the gaps created by sequestration in FY13, acceleration of FY17 force reductions to FY15, and the future 25 percent reductions in two-star level and above headquarters hinder the IWfF's ability to execute RAF. Moving forward with the RAF concept without assessing the risks created by these new gaps prevents the IWfF from prudently applying resources needed to effectively and efficiently execute the CSA's RAF intent.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the restrictions in the 2011 Budget Control Act require the U.S. Army to reduce its end strength to 490,000 by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2017.⁴ The impact of sequestration in FY13 together with future budget reductions forced the Army to accelerate cuts scheduled to occur by the end of FY15.⁵ While acceleration provides short term savings, projected cuts will affect modernization and restructuring efforts across the force. In short, the IWfF must identify gaps created by an increasingly austere fiscal environment. The framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) can aid in assessing gaps which may impede the IWfF's ability to effectively implement RAF.

IWfF Implications

RAF forces "are those Army units assigned or allocated to a Combatant Commander (CCDR), and those capabilities apportioned or service retained, Combatant Command (CCMD) aligned, and prepared by the Army for regional missions."⁶ Regional missions require the active component Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel to have an "understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of

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the countries where they are most likely to be employed.”⁷ Within the CSA’s RAF definition, there are four specified IWtF tasks.

1. Provide IWfF support to a joint task force (JTF) capable headquarters (HQ)
2. Provide forward stationed IWfF forces and capabilities
3. Provide reach-back support from outside the Area of Responsibility (AOR)
4. Initiate Language Proficiency, Regional Expertise and Cultural Knowledge (LREC) across the Total Army⁸

The four task categories provide intelligence support to force generation, support for situational understanding, information collection, and intelligence assistance with regard to targeting and information capabilities.⁹ The challenge will be meeting the RAF initiatives in the contemporary fiscal environment. “Fiscal austerity”¹⁰ is driving changes that “not only [impact] manning and force structure, but also measures to decrease, consolidate, or divest missions, organizations, and functions.”¹¹ Consequently, the changes afoot affect the structure and resources IWfF uses to meet RAF implementation initiatives.

Intelligence WfF: DOTMLPF Analysis

IWfF support to the deployed forces and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process evolved over the past twelve years. MI senior leadership invested heavily in Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, language, culture, and Foundry intelligence training to enhance technical instruction prior to deployment. The term “No Cold Starts” stresses the importance of intelligence personnel understanding the dynamics of the operating environment (OE) across the IWfF disciplines.¹² The Army could not allow the intelligence skills of the redeployed MI Soldiers to atrophy upon return to home station. The effort of “No MI Soldier at Rest” placed troops in reach-back facilities supporting the forward commands with federated intelligence products for the units that were forward deployed.¹³ The catch phrase “No Cold Starts and No MI Soldier at Rest” is the basis for the Army’s “Intelligence 2020 and Beyond” (Intel 2020) initiatives to meet the needs of the future regionally engaged force.¹⁴

Intel 2020 builds on successes gained during twelve years of combat and focuses on improving the IWfF’s responsiveness for an increased range of contingencies. When the CSA announced the RAF concept, the IWfF stood poised to support the CCDRs with best practices to support ARFORGEN training and the CCDR’s operational requirements. Using the CSA’s definition of RAF and the MI mantra of “No Cold Starts and No MI Soldier at Rest,” the Army’s IWfF is aggressively pursuing solutions to meet the CCDR’s need to leverage the entire Intelligence Enterprise.

Balancing IWfF RAF “solutions against an ever reducing budget will require stringent oversight.”¹⁵ Intel 2020 initiatives are costly and force the G2 to make tough funding priority decisions. Modernization sacrifices have long-term second- and third-order effects, whereas sacrifices affecting the operational force (OF) entail immediate and visible impacts. Finding the right balance is important. Using DOTMLPF as a framework can assist in seeing how the IWfF can support RAF implementation. Furthermore, identifying gaps and friction points will aid in establishing a more balanced approach to IWfF resource allocations.

Doctrine

Army Doctrine Publication 2-0 (ADP 2-0) and Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0 (ADRP 2-0), *Intelligence*, outline the key tasks, core competencies, and intelligence disciplines that allow the IWfF to “facilitate an understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations.”¹⁶ Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), *Joint Intelligence Operations*, provides fundamental principles and guidance for intelligence support to joint

operations.¹⁷ Although there are some nuances within joint doctrine, there are no conflicts with the IWfF's four key tasks, four core competencies, or seven intelligence disciplines. There are, however, gaps in the IWfF's abilities to efficiently meet the CSA's implied tasks for RAF.

RAF provides the CCDR a menu of options for creating a JTF headquarters to fulfill the needs of either an emergent crisis or a standing or rotational requirement.¹⁸ The CCDR's mission requirements drive the JTF's organizational structure. Therefore, the IWfF must be prepared to provide capabilities across the spectrum of intelligence disciplines within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multi-national (JIIM) environment.¹⁹ HQ DA EXORD 052-13 aligns "active component Corps and Division HQs to provide at least one joint-capable HQs to each CCMD based on an optimization of requirements."²⁰

Establishing an effective JTF Intelligence Directorate requires significant re-structuring and augmentation to corps or division intelligence staffs in a JTF HQ. While Joint Publication 3-33, *The Joint Task Force Headquarters*, outlines the JTF Intelligence requirements, it lacks a template that allows corps and division intelligence staffs to compare their modified table of organization and equipment (MTO&E) authorizations against the intelligence staff required to execute a JTF.²¹

While there are historical examples of corps and divisions forming the base for JTF HQs, most were ad-hoc organizations forced to establish capabilities during a crisis. Establishing a Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) is not as simple as taking a J2 line-and-block chart and aligning the division or corps intelligence effort accordingly. Lack of joint experience and joint coded staff positions, combined with cuts in two-star level and above headquarters by 25 percent, will exacerbate the ability for these units to establish a JTF capable IWfF. Creating joint manning document (JMD) templates using corps and division MTO&Es against the different JTF mission parameters would enhance the transition to a JTF HQ. These templates could also identify to the CCDR enabler support required to facilitate command and control between the CCDR and the JTF HQ.

Organization

The IWfF structure within the U.S. Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and its subordinate Theater Intelligence Brigades (TIBs) provide critical strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence capabilities to their assigned geographic combatant commands and Army service combatant commands (ASCCs). These TIBs become the anchor points for the Combatant Commands RAF IWfF forces by providing technical and regional expertise to facilitate a common "understanding of the enemy, terrain and civil considerations."²²

The resizing efforts at corps, divisions, and BCTs negatively affect their organic intelligence formations and capabilities. To counter these degradations the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), in coordination with the DA G2 and U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), designed corps-level Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigades (E-MIBs). E-MIBs will provide Regionally Aligned Forces and JTF commanders with downward reinforcing IWfF capabilities as needed. Although still in the force design process, the E-MIB initial concept shows promise in solving some gaps in capabilities and mission command from corps to the BCTs.

The preferred option for organizing a JTF HQ is to form the organization around a combatant command's service component HQ or the service component's existing subordinate HQ (such as a numbered Fleet, numbered Air Force, Marine Expeditionary Force, or Army Corps) that includes an established command structure.²³ Under the RAF concept ASCCs, corps, and division HQs are available to the CCDR to establish a JTF HQ. All of these HQ elements require significant intelligence augmentation to operate at the joint level.

The targeted force reduction of 25 percent at the two and three-star level headquarters will create additional augmentation requirements likely to impact the resource pool used to augment JTF HQs.

Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) requirements, coalition and joint network integration, or simply organizing the IWfF staff effort for JTF headquarters requirements quickly overwhelm the intelligence staffs found in corps and division HQs. Personnel within the IWfF HQ staffs lack the experiences needed to enable joint planning at the JTF level.²⁴ As a result, valuable time is wasted, usually during a crisis, as HQ personnel struggle to stand up a functioning JTF.

The Army and the IWfF should invest in the capabilities inherent within the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The JECC “provides mission-tailored, joint capability packages to Combatant Commanders in order to facilitate rapid establishment of a joint force HQ, fulfill Global Response Force (GRF) execution and bridge joint operational requirements.”²⁵ The JECC brings operations, plans, logistics, intelligence support, knowledge management, communications, and public affairs expertise that can serve for a limited time, no longer than 120 days, with the JTF. The JECC can provide critical joint expertise to train JTF staffs during pre-deployment operations. The intelligence support functional teams within the Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE) help coordinate, manage, and synchronize intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.²⁶ The earlier a corps or division HQs can facilitate JECC coordination and training, the more quickly the IWfF staff can meet the JTF and CCDR’s requirements.

Reach-back is the “process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or materiel from organizations that are not forward deployed.”²⁷ INSCOM, TIBs, and ASCCs have used reach-back support since the 1990’s when secure digital communications became available. The expansion of bandwidth and IWfF digital capabilities over the past twelve years allow tactical and operational units to benefit from reach-back tactics, techniques, and procedures (ITPs). Organizing the IWfF staff for split-based or reach-back operations is a complicated challenge, however. The diversity of disciplines and capabilities within MI produces low-density but high-demand individual requirements. Additionally, shortages in these MI MOSs and capabilities prevent the proper manning needed at two separate locations with 24-hour IWfF coverage.

Reach-back operations within RAF create additional burdens on the IWfF staff. Reach-back requires additional personnel to support a robust and redundant architecture for intelligence systems operating on Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR), Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), and the National Security Agency Net (NSA-NET) that enables analyst access to multidiscipline intelligence traffic. These capabilities reside in sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) which incur additional resources for security and oversight. This support must be available 24/7 until the mission is complete in both the reach-back and forward deployed location.

Requirements for special security officers (SSOs), SCIF accreditation/security, foreign disclosure officer (FDO), staff liaison officers (LNOs), joint automated systems integration, and communication architecture support personnel complicate the corps and division staffs’ ability to effectively conduct reach-back operations. Prior to transformation, Department of the Army (DA) civilian positions within corps and divisions provided the continuity and institutional knowledge for many of these areas. FORSCOM Mission Support Elements (MSEs) assumed responsibilities and capabilities for some of these positions. Thus, reductions in both HQ authorizations and the civilian MSE positions jeopardize the ability to conduct reach-back as directed by the CSA’s specified task.

A comprehensive IWfF troop-to-task assessment for the personnel, equipment, and facilities is needed for reach-back or split-based operations at both corps and division. The requirements may drive certain intelligence capabilities to reside in the reach-back location with none moving forward. The IWfF can provide

the appropriate level of confidence to the forward command only if they are resourced and organized appropriately at both locations.

Language proficiency, regional expertise and cultural knowledge (LREC) are the most complicated, undefined, resource dependent, decentralized, and time consuming RAF tasks for the IWfF to accomplish. Doctrinally it is a complicated web of regulations, organizations, training resources, funding, and personnel proponent requirements. In reality, it is a group of dedicated and hardworking individuals and organizations struggling to respond to a current crisis and/or the needs of a particular combatant command. Consequently, there are no quick solutions to satisfy the RAF tasks associated within LREC.

The DA G2 is the proponent for the Army Language Program. TRADOC is the proponent for culture and language training per AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*.²⁸ While the DA G2 establishes the requirement and proficiency standards for Army linguists, TRADOC, through its assigned Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), trains Army linguists for the Defense Language Placement Test (DLPT). Over the past ten years, TRADOC and the DLIFLC have made tremendous advances in exporting language and culture training to support unit pre-deployment training requirements within the ARFORGEN cycle.

In 2010, HQ DA published EXORD 273-10 “Culture and Language Pre-Deployment Training Standards” for general purpose forces (GPF). These deployment standards required one leader per platoon sized element to receive eight to sixteen weeks of instruction from a language training detachment (LTD) provided by DLIFLC. The training is expensive, costing an estimated \$12.3 million to train 878 Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan between 2009 and 2011.²⁹ Thus the RAF operational concept builds upon successful training solutions to prepare units within the ARFORGEN cycle. Unfortunately, many of these IWfF solutions are at risk due to fiscal austerity and budgetary priorities.

In 2004, the Army transformation to a modular force re-structured the corps, division, and BCT intelligence formations with remnants of prior MI battalion structures. Battalion structures were responsible for all linguist training. The newly transformed modular IWfF formations did not receive the full training resources previously found within traditional MI formations. Further complicating the process was the practice of aligning corps, divisions, and BCTs from the same installation against different operational deployments at staggered stages of the ARFORGEN cycle. To overcome the lack of continuity, FORSCOM created civilian Mission Support Elements (MSEs) as TDA organizations on the continental U.S. (CONUS) FORSCOM installations.

The FORSCOM Mission Support Element (MSE) is a non-deployable Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organization assigned to FORSCOM and attached to FORSCOM operational commanders. It is tasked with providing designated Administrative Control (ADCON)/Title 10 support to FORSCOM units.³⁰

The MSEs assumed the ADCON/Title 10 responsibilities needed to effectively execute the ARFORGEN cycle.³¹ Language and culture training, Foundry training and equipment re-set are a few of the missions the MSE G2 conducts. However, Army National Guard, Army Reserve and Army active component units assigned outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS), such as in European Command (EUCOM), Korea, Hawaii, and Alaska, do not benefit from this FORSCOM MSE initiative.

The impact of sequestration in FY13, acceleration of FY17 force reductions to FY15, and anticipated 25 percent reductions at the two-star level and above headquarters forced the Army to reduce the civilian MSE structure effective in FY16. These reductions will affect the ability of corps, divisions and BCTs to implement RAF in accordance with the Army RAF EXORD and the CSA’s intent. Consequently, any attempt to place the

Title 10 requirements on corps and division G2 staff sections without additional resourcing will severely compound the problem.

A comprehensive review of the IWfF Title 10 functions and responsibilities must occur to clearly define the responsibilities and the resources required to execute the RAF specified and implied tasks. While the MSE is a FORSCOM initiative, it does not cover the total force IWfF requirements. Failure to address this issue early will lead to friction and gaps in the IWfF's ability to support RAF across the DOTMLPF.

A working group needs to be established to determine the personnel, facility, and resources required to execute LREC for the total force. The FORSCOM MSE G2 structure at Ft. Campbell, Ft. Carson, and Joint Base Lewis McCord (JBLM) constitute an apt starting point. The MSE structure established by FORSCOM, however, is not identical at all installations and does not include OCONUS—stationed forces which require the same capability as their CONUS—assigned brethren.

Training

The DA G2 is responsible for “policy formulation, planning, programming, budgeting, management, staff supervision, evaluation and oversight for intelligence activities for the Department of the Army.”³² The *Army Intelligence Training Strategy*, published in January 2014, is the DA G2's training roadmap for a multidisciplinary and versatile MI force that will meet the demands of a regionally-engaged and globally-responsive Army.³³ This strategy for intelligence training capitalizes on the advancements and best practices in the institutional, operational and self-development domains used to provide trained MI forces during twelve years of sustained combat operations.³⁴

The Army RAF EXORD tasks the DA G2 to “assess the impact of RAF on the institutional capabilities for situational awareness, specifically Foundry and Intelligence Readiness and Operating Capability (IROC) and foreign language training.”³⁵ Additionally, the DA G2 has functional management and oversight for both the Army Foreign Language Program and the Army Foundry Program.

Foundry assists commanders by providing training opportunities at their home installations or combat training centers which prepare, certify, and credential the highly-technical MI skill sets within their formations. Foundry training focuses on the commander's IWfF capabilities and deployment readiness needs:

The Foundry Program was established in 2006 to meet the Army Chief of Staff's directive to provide MI Soldiers with the most current intelligence training prior to deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Foundry Program has since grown to 21 Foundry nodes that provide technical training to all components. Foundry training nodes are geographically dispersed to support high densities of intelligence personnel across all components.³⁶

Most Foundry training occurs in SCIFs as it requires network access (unclassified, SIPR, JWICS, NSA-Net), classified database access, automation, subject matter experts (SMEs), mentors, mobile training teams (MTT) and live environment training (LET) funding.³⁷ The Army RAF EXORD tasks the DA G8 to determine the magnitude of additional costs of RAF implementation across the DOTMLPF.³⁸ The EXORD further tasks the DA G8 “in coordination with HQ DA G1, G3/5/7, G4, G6 TRADOC and FORSCOM to provide subject matter experts to provide facilities and infrastructure implications resulting from RAF.”³⁹ DA G2 or INSCOM input is not required.

The DA G2, INSCOM, FORSCOM and TRADOC should create a working group to appraise the ability of RAF units to perform Foundry training and IROC across the total force. In many cases, the Foundry node resides within a SCIF that is occupied by a division or corps with daily operational missions occurring within the same facility. This space problem was mitigated during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) when units on the same installation were staggered in the ARFORGEN cycles and deployments. Now that the Army is in a more stable deployment cycle with longer home station dwell times, units lack needed space within fixed facilities. While certain installations improved IT infrastructure and capabilities within existing SCIFs, the available space is finite. INSCOM can provide valuable insights given its extensive experience in building SCIFs for both CONUS and OCONUS locations.

IROC is an expansion of the “No MI Soldier at Rest” mantra for the RAF IWfF force. It uses reach-back technologies and capabilities to tap into RAF intelligence personnel to support the CCDR’s IWfF needs. IROC tasks RAF corps, divisions, BCTs and other enabler formations to provide federated intelligence products for the intelligence effort of the CCDR. FORSCOM published its IROC concept of the operations (CONOP) on December 03, 2013. IROC is defined as:

Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capability (IROC) is operational mission support that builds upon Foundry training. IROC increases readiness of MI Soldiers and units through single source and multidiscipline reach, over watch, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) operations, and other augmentation to real world intelligence activities in support of Mission Commanders’ requirements. IROC enables Soldiers to remain engaged in global intelligence operations, ensuring MI forces are continuously prepared to perform their validated missions.⁴⁰

IROC requires the same SCIF facilities and capabilities as needed by the Army Foundry Program. Aligning BCTs and divisions against different CCDR AORs compounds the problems of space, training, and IROC operations. This co-mingling of Foundry training and IROC over-watch with multiple CCDR AORs in the same confined SCIF space is as effective as running an M-4 rifle zero range simultaneously with a M1 Abrams tank table-eight qualification range. While the range is possible, it is neither efficient nor effective.

The IROC CONOP utilizes many of the TTPs used during Foundry and LET to prepare IWfF Soldiers to deploy to OIF and OEF. During the latter part of the ARFORGEN cycle, the deploying IWfF Soldiers would work from their home-station SCIFs supporting the TIB and the forward-deployed unit the Soldiers would soon be replacing. These intelligence best practices helped facilitate an understanding of the future OE these Soldiers would encounter and helped prevent cold starts upon arrival to theater. TIBs were critical in supporting this effort. The process was fairly flat between INSCOM TIBs serving as an anchor point and did not require FORSCOM oversight. However, the IROC CONOP states that “any intelligence operations conducted during an IROC activity will be directed and synchronized by FORSCOM and technically managed by the unit and the supported organization.”⁴¹ Thus, an additional layer of oversight is added when it is neither needed nor required.

Once a unit is regionally aligned, direct liaison is authorized with the assigned ASCCs. The RAF IWfF can work directly with their ASCC and corps commands for IROC missions. There is no need for an additional FORSCOM layer within the process. Additionally, IROC is a commander’s program and the IROC CONOP should invest in ways to flatten the process, encourage command presence, participation, and support throughout the execution of the IROC mission.

The DA G2 is proponent for the Army Foreign Language Program as outlined in AR 11-6. This program applies to Army linguists which is any Soldier or DA civilian with a skills qualification identifier (SQI) “L.” This means that the Soldier or DA Civilian scored at least a 2/2 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). The program also covers language capable linguists who have some language proficiency but have not met the proficiency standard.⁴² The Army Foreign Language Program management and oversight “establish[s] the Army’s linguist requirements; identifying, testing, reporting, evaluating, reevaluating, training and assigning Army linguists; while also establishing linguist proficiency standards for the Army.”⁴³

AR 11-6 outlines the requirements for commanders with Army (MI MOS) linguists to establish a command language program, (CLPs). The DA G2 stresses this in the *Army Intelligence Strategy*:

Units must comply with the policy, standards and language training guidance IAW AR 11- 6 to sustain and enhance the language proficiency of language-dependent MI Soldiers as well as language enabled MI Soldiers. Unit Commanders must establish effective Command Language Programs to organize resource and drive world-class language training for our MI Soldiers. Commanders are encouraged to leverage a wide variety of language training, including on-site Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center training (DLIFLC) approved training, Live Environment Training opportunities, Foundry offerings and Distributed Learning options. Commanders must additionally incorporate language training in operational training, whenever possible, to enhance complexity and realism.⁴⁴

As noted, the wide variety of assets and capabilities at the commanders' disposal require extensive coordination and funding to execute. At the unit level, management of the CLP usually resides within the G2 and S2 staffs. Little or no resourcing or expertise is provided to navigate a very complicated process which was once managed by the legacy MI battalions. On select FORSCOM CONUS installations the MSE G2s assumes responsibility for overseeing Army CLP requirements for both Army (MI) linguists and the GPF culture and language programs for deploying Soldiers. Fort Campbell, Fort Carson and Joint Base Lewis-McChord have experienced success assisting with both language and culture training.

By charter the MSE is not subordinate or integrated into the division or corps staffs and supports FORSCOM units only.⁴⁵ Thus units not assigned to FORSCOM, which includes those in Active component OCONUS, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves, do not have the luxury of an MSE to assist the regulatory requirements these programs incur. There is little understanding of MI language requirements and the LREC requirements that RAF creates. DA G2 staff focuses on MI linguists per their responsibilities as the Army foreign language proponent under AR 11-6. TRADOC focuses on culture and language per its responsibilities in AR 350-1. Both organizations use similar terminology, resources, and capabilities. While there are pockets of excellence at the execution level within the FORSCOM MSEs, these organizations are likely to diminish given the projected draw down of civilian positions. If civilian Title 10 positions are reduced, the responsibilities will likely overburden the under resourced G2s and S2s.

LREC and Army linguists support to the RAF concept requires further clarification. What constitutes a regional and cultural expert remains unclear from the RAF vantage. Consolidation of culture and language training, both Army linguists and GPF, under a single proponent must occur. Single proponenty will also allow for more prudent resource investment. Such a consolidation need not reside within the IWfF sections at corps, divisions or BCTs. The Army Civil Affairs (CA) branch could assume this mission and provide divisions and assigned BCTs with culture and language training oversight. The increased emphasis RAF places on culture and language should force the Army to align the CA companies, currently consolidated at the 85th CA Brigade, under the BCT and division structure. CA Soldiers can provide valuable training to both GPF and the nineteen 35P Army cryptologic linguist's authorized in each BCT.

Materiel

IWfF materiel solutions are rarely inexpensive. The IWfF must remain on the technological cutting edge to maintain advantage. The DA G2 must balance funding for future capabilities against current operational requirements. Intel 2020 initiatives are the IWfF's attempt to meet this balance while achieving the needs of a regionally aligned and globally engaged Army. However, ambitious force restructure in the midst of rapid force draw downs and shrinking budgets require sacrifices in both the IWfF's operating force and the generating

force if the RAF concept is to be implemented by FY17. The IWfF's tasks for reach-back support, Foundry, IROC, and support to a JTF HQs require further refinement of the gaps and materiel requirements needed. Gap refinement allows for the prudent balancing of resources between intelligence, modernization initiatives, and the needs of the operational force.

Foundry, IROC, reach-back, and IWfF support to a JTF HQs require a baseline of equipment that should mirror the capabilities found in the forward RAF HQ, ASCC and CCMD intelligence sections. This equipment will streamline technical support requirements and facilitate analysis between HQs. The IROC CONOP annex has an excellent layout, by intelligence discipline, of the requirements for IROC-capable facilities and can serve as a baseline for reach-back requirements as well.

Corps and divisions are not resourced for a garrison operations center and a deployable tactical operations center (TOC). For example, visualization walls (knowledge walls) are required to display the Common Operating Pictures (COPs) in both the SCIF and the operations center. Providing redundant capability allows reach-back operations personnel to have a common operating picture across multiple feeds from various networks. The reach-back sanctuary team must have an intelligence architecture that is integrated into the forward-deployed systems and networks.

The DA G2 staff should provide analysis and subject matter experts to the DA G8 for facility and infrastructure enhancements needed to fully implement reach-back, Foundry training, IROC, and IWfF support to a JTF HQs. The DA G2 staff must capture the baseline of equipment and facilities needed to implement RAF. Only by incorporating this information can the DA G8 conduct an accurate analysis of the costs associated with RAF implementation.

Leadership Development and Education

The Army is committed to the training, education, and development of those responsible for leading units in the complex and challenging future operational environments.⁴⁶ IWfF leadership development and education must include a mix of professional military education (PME) and both operational force and generating force assignments. The more diverse the "career of learning" a Soldier experiences, the greater the IWfF can execute its core competencies,⁴⁷ which include: providing intelligence support to force generation, to situational understanding, information collection, and to targeting and information capabilities.⁴⁸

Twelve years of sustained deployments and increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) created gaps within the learning continuum model. Longer dwell times at home station and slower promotion timelines will allow intelligence personnel to meet PME and assignment gates. In a time of force reductions and austere budgets, the Army must protect PME funding. Budget considerations directly impact the IWfF's ability to provide qualified personnel for RAF.

Personnel

A critical task for the IWfF is to ensure the Army has the sufficient number of MI officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted Soldiers with the correct occupational specialty, appropriate training, and who are available at the right time to support RAF. These MI Soldiers comprise one officer functional area (FA), four officer areas of concentrations (AOCs), and eight warrant officer and fourteen enlisted military occupational specialties (MOSS). The IWfF personnel proponent must maintain oversight of MI force structure changes, personnel accessions, training, professional and educational development total life-cycle management for the IWfF's active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) Soldiers. When there is a change within the Army force structure during the force design process, the Army uses DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (dated 2010), and DA PAM 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and*

Structure (dated 2007) for standards of grade (SOG) tables. The IWfF's personnel proponent must validate the designs to ensure proper SOG that guarantees a healthy career management field (CMF) for all MI Soldiers. Thus, when seemingly small changes to MI MOS authorizations occur during re-design, the changes can negatively impact CMF lifecycle and career opportunities for MI Soldiers.

The near-simultaneous initiatives of grade plate reductions (GPR), ambitious intelligence modernization, and force restructure, coupled with the FY15 accelerated Army end strength reductions, have the potential to damage MI's ability to maintain healthy CMF lifecycles. Disruptions can create career or rank stagnation within the MI branch. This stagnation is detrimental to the IWfF as managing a Soldier's career with the right jobs and experiences, levels of expertise, and required technical skills is time consuming. Compounding the issue are the outdated DA PAMs 600-3 and 611-21 which do not reflect requirements of a smaller, less deployed Army.

DA PAM 600-3 and DA PAM 611-21 require immediate staffing across the Active Component, Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves to determine the knowledge skills and attributes (KSAs) needed for a regionally aligned and globally engaged Army. The IWfF should consider KSAs that include regional and cultural understanding, critical thinking skills, strategic agility, building strategic networks, and a balance of assignments between tactical- and operational-level intelligence formations. Officer and NCO career progression charts must be adjusted to incorporate longer time in grade and enhanced unit dwell times for a smaller and more deployment stable force. A Total Army Analysis (TAA) is needed to capture the GPRs, FY15 draw down of forces, and the 25 percent reduction in two-star level and above headquarters initiatives if we are to identify the capability loss associated with these changes. Any second or third order effects these reductions will have upon the RAF concept has yet to be determined.

Facilities

A critical IWfF task is to bring the JWICS to the fight. The IWfF cannot meet the CSA's RAF intent or meet the CCDR's requirements without it. Whether supporting a JTF HQ, conducting reach-back operations, Foundry training, or executing IROC missions the IWfF must function within a JWICS-enabled environment. JWICS operates at a classification level which requires that data reside within a SCIF.

Prior to Army transformation, JWICS capabilities were at division level and above intelligence units. Army transformation and modularity pushed the JWICS capability to the BCTs within the assigned military intelligence company (MICO). The BCTs received the tactical capabilities for JWICS, but did not receive resources to build dedicated SCIFs in garrison. Under the RAF concept, however, these BCT S2 sections and assigned MICOs must provide their commanders with all-source intelligence analysis of the GCC AOR to which the BCT is aligned. These S2s must execute the IWfF's core tasks of "providing intelligence support to force generation, providing intelligence support to situational understanding, conducting information collection, and providing intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities"⁴⁹ whether in garrison or forward deployed.

SCIFs are expensive to build, secure, and resource. Most corps and division SCIFs do not have room to host the BCT MICO personnel and equipment for extended periods. RAF could align BCT, divisions, and corps HQs on the same installation to different geographic combatant commands which would drive different intelligence analytical efforts. Accreditation, IT infrastructure, and security requirements make providing individual SCIFs to each BCT cost prohibitive. Conversely, there are a few BCTs within FORSCOM that have SCIFs which unfortunately creates IWfF capability gaps among the different RAF units.

BCT S2s and their assigned MICOs require a secure space in garrison that allows them to turn on their tactical JWICS networks, plug in the Distributive Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) systems and

conduct all-source analysis for the BCT commanders. BCT S2 staffs and MICOs do not require large SCIFs as they do not have the analytical footprint or the robust IT infrastructure of the division and corps G2 Analysis Control Element (ACE) SCIFs.

The Army should create consolidated BCT SCIFs on installations which allows BCT IWfF staffs to use their assigned tactical JWICS capable systems and DCGS-A in a garrison environment. This basic facility would have the same perimeter and interior security required for a SCIF. Each BCT would have rooms to conduct all source intelligence analysis within a JWICS enabled environment. Using assigned tactical JWICS and DCGS-A systems does not require the robust IT infrastructure that the larger SCIFs contain. BCT intelligence staffs would simply require an area that allows for securing the tactical vehicle systems within the SCIF accredited security perimeter, attach the system to prime power, and run network cables inside the building to the tactical DCGS-A systems. When required to deploy, these BCT IWfF staffs simply unplug the tactical systems and depart.

The Army RAF EXORD tasks the DA G8 to determine the magnitude of additional costs of RAF implementation across the DOTMLPF.⁵⁰ The DA G2 staff must inject itself into the DA G8 assessments of increased costs of facilities, infrastructure and personnel associated with implementing the RAF concept. The DA G2 staff in coordination with INSCOM and FORSCOM should capture these additional costs with appropriate risk assessments to the RAF mission. Consequently, HQ INSCOM can also provide subject matter experts from within their Directorate of Engineers for cost estimates for both CONUS and OCONUS SCIF construction.

Conclusion

RAF missions require Intelligence Warfighting Function personnel within the Army Active Component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve to have an “understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed.”⁵¹ The IWfF must execute the RAF tasks of providing support to a JTF capable HQ; provide forward stationed forces and capabilities; execute reach-back support from outside the AOR; and conduct LREC training across the total force.⁵² Using these tasks and the DA G2’s mantra of “no cold starts and no mi soldier at rest,” the IWfF is aggressively pursuing solutions which leverage the greater intelligence enterprise.

IWfF support to the RAF concept builds upon twelve years of deployment best practices and TTPs used to prepare, train, and certify units in the ARFORGEN cycle. The Army’s previous transformation and modularity efforts created gaps in capabilities, Title 10 training, and intelligence certifications needed for MI units to access the greater intelligence enterprise. Large defense budgets and overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding allowed the Army to find materiel and personnel solutions to intelligence training and capability gaps. Unfortunately, many of these solutions are cost prohibitive in the fiscally constrained environment and are now creating capabilities gaps that are possibly unrecognized by senior leadership. To move forward without assessing the risks created by new gaps across the DOTMLPF, the IWfF cannot prudently apply resources needed to effectively and efficiently support the RAF mission.

Notes

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